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This study explores the bank lending decision puzzle in Chinese listed firms. Banks are 
known to play a certification role for borrowing firms, reflected by loan announcements 
generating abnormal positive returns for borrowing firms in stock markets. In contrast, 
negative market reactions towards the bank loan announcements exist when Chinese 
firms borrow. If Chinese banks make efficient lending decisions, why do Chinese banks 
not provide certification for borrowing firms?  This thesis focuses on whether and how 
banks treat earnings management in borrowing firms when they make lending decisions. 
I predict that banks may not always exert effort to detect earnings management and the 
observed positive relationship between loan size and firm profitability is due to earnings 
management.  
Using firm performance before and after adjustment for earnings management, I am able 
to investigate whether banks examine the credibility and reliability of reported earnings 
of borrowing firms. I find that, when firm performance is adjusted for earnings 
management, it is no longer related to bank loan size in some cases. Specifically, the 
positive relationship between bank loan size and firm performance disappears for loans 
by state owned banks to state owned enterprises (SOE) and loans by small and medium 
sized banks to both SOEs and non-SOEs.  
 
These findings show that bank-lending decisions vary according to bank-firm ownership 












1.1 Background and Motivation 
Conventional wisdom states that banks play a certification role because they act as a 
delegated monitor (Diamond, 1984) and they have informational advantages in the form 
of “inside debt” (Fama, 1985; Rajan and Winton, 1995). Hence, researchers predict that 
bank loan announcements should convey a positive signal to stock markets due to their 
certification value on borrowers’ creditworthiness. However, the empirical evidence is 
mixed. For example, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) find that loan 
announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns for borrowers, but public 
debt is associated with neutral or slightly negative abnormal returns. Billett et al. (1995) 
find no significant difference between the market's response to bank and non-bank loans. 
To reconcile these mixed results and understand the certification role of banks clearly, 
recent studies have explored bank loan announcement effects from the perspective of the 
characteristics of lenders and borrowers (e.g., Fields et al., 2006; Demiroglu and James, 
2007; Bailey et al., 2011; Herbohn et al., 2019)1. Li and Huang (2018) find that improving 
firm accounting conservatism can reduce the negative market reaction to the 
announcement of bank loans. However, whether and how banks play a certification role 
remains an empirical question.  
 
This study is motivated by the lack of empirical evidence on the bank loan 
 
1 Loan announcement effects are particularly significant for smaller and weaker borrowers (Fields et al., 
2006), and loans with particularly demanding covenants (Demiroglu and James 2007). Bailey et al. (2011) 
find loan announcement effects vary from loans granted by banks with different types of ownership. 
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announcements puzzle which has contrary findings in other markets. I aim to provide 
additional evidence by exploring the variations in bank lending decisions to understand 
the different effects on loan announcements. Prior studies on bank loan announcement 
effects have implicitly assumed that bank lending decisions depend largely on firm 
profitability because banks are fixed-income investors and concerned about borrowers’ 
repayment commitment. Bertrand et al. (2007) provides empirical evidence by linking 
bank loan size to firm profitability to show an efficient lending decision. Pan and Tian 
(2018) find that firms’ bank connections can improve banks’ lending decisions by 
reinforcing the positive relationship between bank loan size and firm profitability but 
firms’ political connection weaken the relationship (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 
2009, Zheng and Zhu, 2013). Therefore, I investigate whether bank loan announcement 
effects reflect the bank lending decision, i.e., to what extent is the size of the bank loan 
linked to firm profitability? 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The Chinese market is an ideal setting because it provides sufficient tension from the 
perspective of institutional environment and empirical findings. “On the one hand, the 
Chinese government continues to control the banking industry and corporate sector, 
leading to a heterogeneous ownership structure of banks and firms. This cross-sectional 
variation in ownership structure allows an examination of lending decisions which are 
likely to vary according to bank-firm ownership relationships (e.g. state-owned banks 
(SBs) or foreign banks (FB) grant loans to SOEs) and non-SOEs.” On the other hand, in 
contrast to findings in developed markets, borrowers’ stock value typically decreases 
around loan announcements in China (Bailey et al., 2011). Nevertheless, an increasing 
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body of empirical evidence shows that Chinese banks on average use commercial 
judgement to make efficient lending decisions based on borrower profitability, and 
documents a positive relationship between bank loan size and firm profitability (e.g., Cull 
and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009, Zheng and Zhu, 2013). These inconsistent findings 
regarding efficient bank lending decisions and negative market reactions to bank loan 
announcements challenge the classic bank monitoring theory and existing findings on 
bank certification value.  
 
A plausible explanation for the inconsistency is that Chinese banks may not exert 
effective monitoring when making lending decisions, and the documented positive 
relationship between bank loan size and firm profitability is merely cosmetic due to the 
effects of earnings management. A reasonable commercial bank should maximize return 
on capital and allocate and price loans according to borrowers’ risk profiles and 
profitability (Dinç, 2005). In the presence of severe government intervention on the 
banking industry, Chinese banks, especially SBs usually follow the objectives set by 
politicians to serve political objectives and tend to allocate and price loans according to 
political preferences. Moreover, compared with non-SOEs, SOEs in China are more 
favored by banks due to state ownership and implicit government guarantees (usually 
known as soft budget constraints), which may further alleviate banks’ concern about 
repayments (Lin and Tan, 1999; Lu et al., 2012). Hence, to address the puzzle, this study 
focuses on determining whether banks in China perform treatment of earnings 
management on borrowing firms when they make lending decisions and explore whether 
those treatment on borrowing firms’ earnings management relates to loan announcements 
effects. 
 
Prior studies implicitly assume that banks exert effective monitoring through lending, 
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and generally use the relationship between loan terms and reported performance2 as a 
proxy for bank lending decisions. This measurement can only test whether banks use 
quantitative measures (e.g., firm profitability) in the credit evaluation process but cannot 
capture whether banks pay attention to qualitative measures (e.g., the reliability of firms’ 
profitability). Yet if Chinese banks do not exert effective monitoring in lending decisions 
as mentioned previously, the relationship between bank loan size and reported 
performance may not effectively capture banks’ monitoring efforts. In addition, there is 
an extensive literature documenting earnings management is prevalent in Chinese listed 
firms (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Liu and Lu, 2007; Jian and Wong 
2010; Aharony et al., 2010; Qi et al., 2017). Hence, since firm profitability can be 
managed, it is doubtful whether the previously documented positive relationship between 
bank loan size and firm profitability demonstrates that lending activities also take into 
consideration the reliability of firms’ profitability and other qualitative measures. 
Collectively, I contend that the positive relationship between bank loan size and firm 
profitability is largely influenced by earnings management in China, and the negative 
market reactions to bank loan announcements reflect inefficient lending decisions. 
 
To capture whether banks exert effective monitoring in lending decisions by 
detecting earnings management, I follow Cornett et al. (2008) where they argue that firms’ 
reported profitability actually reflects the adjustment of earnings management, and firms’ 
real profitability can be obtained by extracting earnings management from their reported 
profitability. I use the sensitivity between bank loan size and profitability adjusted for 
earnings management, which allows me to determine whether banks pay attention to both 
 
2 As earnings are employed as a summary measure of firm performance by various users (Dechow, 1994), 
to a great extent firm performance reflects a borrower’s debt capacity and level of credit risk. 
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quantitative and qualitative measures. If banks do not detect firms’ earnings management, 
bank loan size should not relate to the firm’s unmanaged profitability, and negative stock 
price reactions will occur. 
 
1.3 Results of study 
Using a sample of listed firms in China between 2003 and 2014, I document the 
following main findings. First, consistent with my expectation, bank loan size is 
positively related to reported return on assets ratio (ROA) which is the proxy for firm 
profitability. However, when reported ROA is adjusted for earnings management, the 
positive relationship disappears. Specifically, this observation holds for lending to SOEs 
but not for lending to non-SOEs. When I further distinguish lending by bank types, I find 
that the abovementioned observation holds when SOEs receive loans from SBs. Moreover, 
loans from FBs are positively related to adjusted ROA for all types of borrowers. 
Regarding the market reactions to bank loan announcements, the negative effects of bank 
loan announcements occur when loan size is not related to unmanaged ROA, which is 
consistent with my predictions. My results could be affected by bias in earnings 
management. To ensure my findings are robust, I employ two alternative measures of 
earnings management. One is earnings management after netting out the effects of large 
external financing cash flows, and the other one is Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.  
Consistency across these two alternative measures indicate my results are less likely to 
be driven by bias in earnings management measurement. My main findings are also robust 
to a series of alternative tests, including firm fixed effects regression, and regression using 





This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, prior studies typically 
use the relationship between bank loan size and reported performance to proxy bank 
lending decisions (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009, Zheng and Zhu, 2013). By 
exploring the earnings management adjustment on firm profitability, this study uses a 
new measure by linking bank loan size to the unmanaged profitability to investigate the 
monitoring role of banks. Specifically, I show that the positive relationship between bank 
loan size and unmanaged profitability can indicate the effectiveness of banks’ monitoring, 
while the relationship between bank loan size and reported profitability is merely 
cosmetic mainly for government-related loans, which complements the findings of prior 
studies that Chinese banks use commercial judgement in making lending decisions (Cull 
and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009).  
 
Second, prior studies have exploited the characteristics of banks or loans to analyse the 
effects of bank loan announcements, and my study complements these studies by 
exploiting the bank lending decision to understand the effects of bank loan 
announcements. My results show that negative reactions to bank loan announcements 
occur when bank lending decisions are not commercially based, i.e., bank loan size is not 
associated with firm unmanaged profitability. In reference to studies by Diamond (1984) 
and Fama (1985), my analysis suggests that even though there is a positive relationship 
between bank loan size and firm reported performance, bank loans lose their certification 
value if they do not make effective efforts to screen and monitor borrowers through 
lending. Results of this study provide an additional perspective on conflicting evidence 
in the literature on bank loan announcement effects in the Chinese market. 
 
Third, the existing literature on the information role of banks consists typically of 
event-driven studies (e.g., James 1987; Billett et al. 1995; Fields et al. 2006; Ross 2010; 
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Herbohn et al., 2019). My study adds to the literature by connecting loan announcement 
effects with bank lending practice. Furthermore, unlike the US, disclosure of bank loan 
information is mandatory for Chinese listed firms, and their decisions on announcing 
bank loans are in most cases not discretionary. Hence, my study to a large extent alleviates 
selection bias, which is a common problem in the literature with reference to the the 
effects of bank loan announcements (Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011).  
 
1.5 Structure of this study 
The structure of the study proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview 
introducing the background and motivation, research questions, results and contribution. 
Then, Chapter 2 presents a literature review and hypothesis development. The data and 
research design are discussed in Chapter 3 while in Chapter 4 the empirical results are 
reported, including summary statistics, regression results and outcomes on bank loan 
announcement effects. Chapter 5 presents a battery of additional tests, which deal with 
the bias in earnings management and the endogeneity issue and includes an additional 
robustness test. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the research and discusses the implications 







Chapter 2: Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
 
2.1 China’s banking sector 
China’s banking sector plays a critical role in supporting its growing economy. 
Despite the fact that the Chinese stock market has developed rapidly in recent years, 
raising external equity capital is difficult and bank loans still remain the main source for 
external financing (Jiang et al. 2017). By the end of 2017, bank loans accounted for 
approximately 58% of total fundraising for the non-financial sector, and it is still 
significantly larger than the share of the stock market (8%) and corporate bond market 
(11%). The banking and credit industry has developed rapidly over the last few decades 
in tandem with country’s economic growth. The China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) reports that the total assets of China's banking institutions reached RMB 282.5 
trillion (about US$ 39.98 trillion) at the end of 2019. In recent years, due to interest rate 
liberalization and the rapid growth of shadow banking, the banking sector has expanded 
at a modest rate. However, compared with 2018, the total assets of China's banking sector 
in 2019 still increased by 8.1%. 
 
The banking sector in China can be classified into three groups, namely, SBs, small 
and medium state-owned commercial banks (SMBs) and FBs. First, SBs consist of the 
five largest commercial banks, these being the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), the Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC) and Bank of Communications (BCOM). These banks jointly account for 




Second, SMBs comprise 13 joint-equity banks and more than 133 city commercial 
banks. The joint-equity banks are jointly owned by local governments, SOEs and private 
investors. With the development of China’s economy and banking reforms, the market 
share of joint-equity banks increased from 14% at the end of 2003 to 17.53% in 2018. 
Furthermore, city commercial banks are generally owned by local governments. These 
city commercial banks were formerly not allowed to expand beyond their civic 
boundaries. However, after 2004, they were freed from this geographical restriction and 
several city commercial banks have since merged. Over the past few years, the city 
commercial banks have grown at a very rapid rate. Their market share has increased from 
less than 1% in 2003 to 12.80% in 2018. Thus, compared with previous studies, I can 
explore foreign banks’ lending decisions by using firm-level data. Third, after joining the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China committed itself to opening the 
banking sector to foreign banks by 2006, when FBs were granted access to the Chinese 
market. The business of FBs has expanded quickly, and their total assets increased sharply 
from 416 billion RMB in 2003 to 3.24 trillion RMB (about US$430.8 trillion) in 2017.  
However, the market share of foreign banks has not changed much and remained at 1.2% 
at the end of 2017, although their assets have expanded rapidly during the past decade. 
Finally, the Chinese government launched a pilot program in 2014, in which the 
establishment of five new privately owned banks was permitted.3 The advent of more 
privately owned banks has intensified the competitiveness of China’s banking sector. 
 
With the implementation of financial reforms and private sector firms taking a greater 
 
3 The CBRC will allow privately owned banks to be established in the cities of Shanghai and Tianjin and 
in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces. A total of ten firms, including Alibaba, Tencent and Fosun, will 
participate in the project. By 2014, WeBank and Shanghai Huarui Bank were established. 
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proportion of China’s economy, some argue that credit discrimination against private 
sector firms in China has been mitigated, because Chinese banks currently grant loans 
based on commercial criteria, which was not the case during the planned economy era 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2013). For example, the China Construction Bank, one of the five largest 
state-owned banks, announced that its total loans to private firms increased significantly 
from 18.4% in 2007 to 35% in 2011, while Minsheng Bank, a private bank, stated that it 
granted more than 62% of its total loans to private sector firms in 2010. However, another 
view is that Chinese banks’ lending decisions in regard to private firms are largely 
determined by bribery or political connections, rather than business performance (e.g., Lu 
et al. 2012). Collectively, whether Chinese banks really follow commercial criteria and 
have begun to play a monitoring role is still an empirical question. 
 
2.2 Literature on earnings management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings managements as follows: “Earnings 
management arises when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying firm performance or to impact contractual results which rely on reported 
accounting numbers.” Prior studies document that firms’ earnings management is related 
a number of financial activities. Teoh et al. (1998a) find that firms manage earnings 
upward prior to initial public offering (IPO) and that such earnings management is 
negatively related to post-issue return performance. Teoh et al. (1998b) document similar 
findings on abnormal accruals before seasoned equity offerings (SEO). Kim and Park 
(2005) show that seasoned equity offering firms conduct earnings management when they 
issue new shares at inflated prices. Moreover, Liu et al. (2010) find that firms manage 
earnings upward before issuing public bonds and achieve a lower cost of borrowing. In 
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regard to banks, Shen and Huang (2013) find in their cross-country data that firms’ 
earnings management is negatively associated with credit rating and increases borrowing 
costs. Mafrolla and D'Amico find (2017) that private firms are engaged in earnings 
management to achieve better borrowing capacity. Lennox et al., (2018) find that auditors 
make larger downward adjustment to firms’ earnings before stock-financed acquisitions. 
Beladi et al. (2018) find that corporate tax avoidance has a negative effect on is positively 
related to bank loans and the interest on bank loans and loan interests in Chinese listed 
firms. Li et al. (2018) find that Chinese listed firms with lower level of real earnings 
management receive more low interest loans. Apart from fund raising activities, previous 
studies document that firms are engaged in earnings management to avoid a decrease in 
earnings, and to meet sell side analyst’ earnings expectations (e.g., Graham et al., 2005). 
These studies indicate that investors and creditors greatly depend on firms’ reported 
financial information in investment decisions; firms have a strong incentive to conduct 
earnings management to influence investors’ perceptions of their performance and risk.  
 
In regard to China, a number of studies document that Chinese firms’ earnings 
management is associated with tunnelling activities. Liu and Lu (2007) provide evidence 
that earnings management by Chinese listed firms is significantly related to the tunnelling 
activities of controlling shareholders. Ding et al. (2007) explore the relation between 
ownership structure and firms’ earnings management behaviours and document that there 
is an inverted U-shape pattern. Jian and Wong (2010) provide evidence that Chinese listed 
firms manipulate earnings through related-party transactions. Aharony et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that earnings management behaviours are driven by the expectation of 
tunnelling opportunities after the firm goes public.  
 
Apart from conventional incentives to engage in earnings management, Chinese 
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firms have strong incentives to manage earnings to satisfy regulatory requirements 
(Aharony et al., 2000). First, a special delisting regulation was introduced by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1998. Specifically, a listed firm that reports 
a net loss for two consecutive years will be flagged with ST (special treatment), and with 
*ST if the ST firm cannot turn loss into gain over the next year. Furthermore, the CSRC 
requires that a listed firm must have made profits in the past three years if it is to issue 
new shares. Thus, Chinese firms have strong incentives to manage earnings to avoid being 
capped with ST or *ST or to obtain the right to issue new shares. Collectively, these 
studies show earnings management behaviour is prevalent in Chinese listed firms. Despite 
the fact that earnings management behaviour may not necessarily be illegal in China, it 
distorts the accounting information and may mislead some stakeholders. 
 
Finally, a number of studies employ earnings management as a proxy for firms’ 
quality of corporate governance (e.g., Kim et al., 2016; Dai et al., 2017). Considering that 
firms’ corporate governance quality is an important factor for financing (Lin et al., 2011), 
how earnings management influences financing activities is still under-researched.   
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
As previously mentioned, earnings management behaviour is prevalent in Chinese 
listed firms (e.g., Liu and Lu, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Jian and Wong, 2010; Qi et al., 
2017), and reported earnings performance may not reflect the real financial status. To 
assess precisely borrowers’ credit risks and protect their own interests through making 
efficient lending decisions, it is expected that a reasonable commercial bank will take into 
account the effects of earnings management, which should be an important consideration 
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in banks’ assessment of credit risk4. Thus, if banks make efficient lending decisions, there 
should be a positive relationship between bank loan size and unmanaged performance. 
 
However, banks may exhibit different lending patterns towards SOEs and non-SOEs. 
SOEs are controlled by the governments and usually have multiple goals to satisfy 
politicians’ personal and social objectives, such as maintaining social stability and 
regional employment (Borisova and Megginson, 2011). In this sense, SOEs are less likely 
to become bankrupt and financially distressed SOEs are likely to receive government 
financial support, due to the implicit government guarantee and soft budget constraints 
(Kornai, 1986; Qian and Roland, 1998; Lin and Tan, 1999). Apart from these, the 
government intervention in the banking industry causes some bankers to maintain good 
relationships with the political authorities, since they are broadly controlled by the 
government (Lu et al., 2012). Under these circumstances, banks are expected to have a 
weaker incentive to screen or monitor SOE borrowers, especially when lending banks are 
controlled by the government. Given a loan approval process, banks’ loan officers may 
place less weight on qualitative assessment and make SOEs muddle through the credit 
risk assessment. Therefore, I contend that banks may implement less monitoring efforts 
when lending to SOEs, and do not pay attention to SOEs’ earnings management behavior 
or the credibility of their earnings. Accordingly, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Bank loan size has no relationship with unmanaged profitability in SOEs, 
especially when lending banks are government controlled. 
 
 
4 Under the law, Chinese banks must have independent departments for evaluating the credit risk (Chen et 
al., 2013). The credit department estimates a borrowing firm’s credit risk by analysing in detail its 




Unlike SOEs, non-SOEs do not enjoy implicit government guarantee, which makes 
banks feel less secure about their lending (Brandt and Li, 2003; Lu et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, banks suffer less pressure from the government when lending to non-SOEs 
(Chen et al., 2010). Hence, I should expect that banks will follow commercial criteria and 
exert efforts to detect earnings management behaviours in lending decisions, because they 
will face losses if non-SOEs encounter financial distress and cannot generate adequate 
profits to cover loan repayments. Consequently, it is expected that banks will be more 
concerned about true performance in non-SOEs. On this basis the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
 
H2: Bank loan size has a positive relationship with unmanaged performance in non-
SOEs. 
 
The traditional finance theory suggests that banks play a unique certification role for 
borrowers because they are delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984) and a form of “inside 
debt” (Fama, 1985). Thus, bank loan announcements should convey a positive signal to 
the stock market and certify the creditworthiness of borrowers. Hence, when a bank 
makes an efficient lending decision, there should be positive bank loan announcements. 
Accordingly, my third hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H3: Bank loan announcements generate a positive return for borrowing firms if bank 
loan size has a positive relationship with unmanaged performance. 
 
However, an inefficient lending decision indicates that less effort has been made for 
screening and monitoring by lenders, which could stir investors’ uncertainty about 
borrowers’ creditworthiness (Bailey et al. 2011). Hence, banks’ inefficient lending 
decisions may relate to unfavourable value effects of bank loan announcements. 
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Accordingly, negative bank loan announcements effects should be aligned with 
inefficient bank lending decisions, and my fourth and last hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4: Bank loan announcements generate a negative return for borrowing firms if 












3.1 Sample selection 
The initial sample consists of all firms listed on both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges for the period 2003-2014, and the data is obtained from the China Securities 
Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The sample period begins in 2003 
because China adopted new accounting and auditing standards in 2002. My study requires 
splitting the sample into SOEs and non-SOEs. The classification of firm type is based on 
the attributes of the largest shareholder in the firm. Shareholder information is also 
obtained from CSMAR. To form the sample, I eliminate observations flagged with ST or 
*ST because labeling special treatment (ST) is due to irregularities in their financial 
statements and loss for two or three consecutive years. Furthermore, because the finance 
industry is very different compared to other industries, observations from the financial 
industry is deleted. I also exclude firm-year observations with missing information, which 
leaves us with a sample of 1,599 firms with 16,622 firm-year observations.  
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Banks’ lending decisions 
To achieve an optimal lending decision and ensure that potential borrowers are able 
to satisfy their loan repayment commitment, banks should decide the amount of the loans 
based on the borrower’s profitability (Firth et al., 2009). Thus, following Bertrand et al. 
(2007) and Zheng and Zhu (2013), I use the sensitivity between newly granted bank loans 





∆𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                      
(1) 
 
where ∆DEBT is the change in the ratio of bank loans to total assets in the current year. 
ROA is return on assets, which is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. Size 
is firm size, which is measured as the one-year lagged natural log of total assets. 
Tangibility is one-year lagged net fixed assets divided by total assets. Leverage is one-
year lagged total liabilities divided by total assets. Board is the natural log of the total 
number of directors on the boards in the current year. Indep is the number of independent 
directors to the total number of directors on the boards. Political is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the CEO or director on a firm’s board has a government background which 
is including government official, military official, deputy of National People's Congress 
(NPC), member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) in the current year and zero otherwise. The industry effect and year 
effect are also controlled in the model. i, t are firm and year index, respectively. 
 
As banks should evaluate borrowers’ credit risks based on their prior performance in 
the credit assessment process, I employ one-year lagged profitability which is consistent 
with prior studies (e.g., Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013). I include Board and Indep 
to control for borrowing firms’ corporate governance, as previous studies suggest that a 
firm’s corporate governance is closely linked to its performance (e.g., Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996; Core et al., 1999). Moreover, a number of studies suggest that politically 
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connected firms have an advantage in obtaining more bank loans (Faccio et al., 2006). To 
control for the effects of borrowers’ political connections, I include Political, which is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEO or director on a board has a government 
background and zero otherwise. Moreover, Allen et al. (2005) suggest that relationships 
play an important role in firms’ financing channels in China. At the same time, hiring 
people with a banking background as members of the board is typical in Chinese listed 
firms. So, it is possible these firms may benefit from this situation when they borrow from 
banks. Accordingly, I include Banker, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO 
or director of the board comes from a banking background.  
 
3.2.2 Firms’ unmanaged performance 
As mentioned earlier, I use a firm’s reported ROA as a measurement of a firm’s 
reported performance. It is widely employed to measure firm performance and is 
documented as a key determinant in obtaining bank loans. Nevertheless, managers may 
camouflage firm performance by adjusting sales and accounts receivable. Thus, it is 
necessary to remove the impact of possible management on relevant accruals to obtain 
unmanaged performance. 
 
Following Cornett et al. (2008), I measure firms’ unmanaged performance by 
removing the impact of accruals management from reported performance. There are 
several earnings management measures which may be employed to capture the impact of 
accruals management. However, by taking into account the bank lending process and 
Chinese institutional features, I employ the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow 
et al., 1995) in this study. First, when banks’ lending process starts, banks need to collect 
and evaluate borrowing firms’ past financial information first, and then estimate whether 
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the firm could generate sufficient cash flow to repay the loan in the future. Thus, the 
model which measures accruals based on future information cannot be employed as banks 
can only obtain present and past information about firms when they start a credit 
assessment. For example, Dechow and Dichev (2002) in their approach measure accruals 
based on past, present and future cash flows. Since the modified Jones model measures 
accruals based on present and past information, it fits the actual state of banks’ lending 
process. Furthermore, consistent with lenders’ prudence on the quality of accounts 
receivable, the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model is employed to 
estimate discretionary accruals.  
 













                   (2)                                                                                                                                 
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is total accruals in year t, calculated as [change in current assets − change 
in current liabilities −  change in cash −  change in debt in current liabilities − 
depreciation and amortization expense], 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1  is one-year lagged total assets, 
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the change in revenue in year t, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is property, plant, and equipment, 
while i, t are firm and year index, respectively. These definitions follow those of Kothari 
et al. (2005). 
 


















where ?̂?0,  ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 are estimated from regression Eq. (2)
5. ΔARit is the change in 
accounts receivable, %DAit  is discretionary accruals as a fraction of assets. Other 
variables are defined as in Eq. (2). 
 
Since %DA is measured as a fraction of assets which can be subtracted from ROA, 
this study uses unmanaged ROA as the proxy of a firm’s unmanaged performance. Due 
to the discretionary accrual being removed from reported ROA, unmanaged ROA should 
capture firms’ unmanaged performance rather than managed accounting performance. 
 
I estimate sets of regressions to examine whether and how firms’ reported, as well as 
unmanaged, performance affects the bank loan size, and whether and how the ownership 
structures of banks and borrowers influence these relationships. I first estimate model (1) 
to examine the relationship between bank loan size and a firm’s reported performance, 
and then replace reported ROA with unmanaged ROA to test whether a firm’s unmanaged 
performance relates to bank loan size. Moreover, I further conduct analysis for 
subsamples divided according to lender and borrower ownership. 
3.2.3 Event study methodology 
To investigate whether bank loan announcements effects are aligned with bank lending 
decisions, I employ a conventional event-study methodology. Following Harvey et al. 
(2004) and Bailey et al. (2011), I examine cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by using 
market model. Considering that a firm may borrow from banks more than once a year, 
longer estimation windows may bear the risk of covering structural breaks (e.g., due to 
confounding events). Hence, consistent with Bailey et al. (2011), the estimation window, 
[−120,−21], is employed for calculating the market model parameters.  
 
5 Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) suggest that that “modified Jones (1991) model” provides the most 
power for detecting earnings management by comparing several models of accruals management. Bartov, 
Gul, and Tsui (2001) also suggest employing the modified Jones model, estimated in a cross-section using 
other firms in the same industry. Consistent with prior studies, a minimum of 10 observations is required 










4.1 Summary statistics  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for change in total bank loan, a firm’s 
reported ROA, unmanaged ROA and other variables about firm characteristics. The mean 
change in total bank loans is 0.030, which is similar to prior studies (Zheng and Zhu, 
2013). The mean reported ROA is 0.030 and this is similar to the 0.033 reported by Lu et 
al. (2012). The average unmanaged ROA is 0.02. The average of discretionary accruals 
on assets is 0.01, the same as that reported by Liu and Lu (2007). However, Cornett et al. 
(2008) reported mean discretionary accruals on assets in their US sample as 0.0039. Not 
surprisingly, earnings management activities in China are more severe than in a more 
developed economy. Definitions of these variables are summarized in Appendix. Table 2 
presents the univariate tests of change in total bank loan, a firm’s reported ROA, 
unmanaged ROA and other variables about firm characteristics. for SOE and non-SOE 
samples. We can observe that the average of discretionary accruals on assets size is 
significantly higher for non-SOEs, indicating that non-SOEs are more engaged in 
earnings management activities than SOEs.  
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Table 1   
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. 25th 75th N 
∆DEBT 0.030 0 0.130 -0.030 0.070 16622 
Reported ROA 0.030 0.030 0.080 0.010 0.060 16622 
%DA 0.010 0.010 0.110 -0.050 0.060 16622 
Unmanaged ROA 0.020 0.020 0.110 -0.040 0.080 16622 
Size 21.58 21.46 1.250 20.74 22.28 16622 
Tangibility 0.280 0.250 0.190 0.140 0.410 16622 
Leverage 0.220 0.210 0.160 0.090 0.330 16622 
Board 9.220 9 1.920 9 10 16622 
Indep 0.360 0.330 0.050 0.330 0.380 16622 
Political 0.380 1 0.490 1 1 16622 
Banker 0.260 0 0.440 0 1 16622 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 16,622 firm-year 











∆DEBT 0.261 0.116 0.145 0.915 
Reported ROA 3.143 0.024 3.119 1.077 
%DA 0.010 0.004 0.006*** 3.321 
Unmanaged ROA 3.133 0.020 3.113 1.075 
Size 21.131 21.891 -0.760*** -38.572 
Tangibility 0.253 0.306 -0.053*** -18.086 
Leverage 0.307 0.221 0.086 1.513 
Board 8.779 9.560 -0.781*** -25.905 
Indep 0.363 0.357 0.006*** 7.007 
Political 0.404 0.370 0.034*** 4.423 
Banker 0.291 0.226 0.066*** 9.626 
Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 





4.2 Regression results  
4.2.1 Bank lending decisions and borrowers’ earnings management  
Table 3 presents results concerning the regressions of the relationship between a 
firm’s reported performance, unmanaged performance and bank loan size. The first two 
columns report the results for the full sample, and the remaining columns report the results 
for both SOE and non-SOE subsamples. I observe that the coefficient on firms’ reported 
ROA is positive and significant for the full sample in column 1, which is consistent with 
prior studies (Cull and Xu, 2003; Zheng and Zhu, 2013). Moreover, column 3 and 5 show 
that the positive relationship holds for both SOE and non-SOE subsamples, indicating 
banks’ lending patterns do not vary for different types of borrowers when effects of 
earnings mangement are not taken into account. This suggests that banks tend grant more 
loans to more profitable firms without considering firms’ earnings management behaviors. 
However, the coefficient on firms’ unmanaged ROA is insignificant in column 2, which 
implies that the observed positive relationship in column 1 is merely cosmetic. This 
suggests that banks in China generally do not use qualitative measures in lending 
decisions, as they do not generally enact effective efforts to detect firms’ earnings 
management behaviours. After dividing the full sample into SOE and non-SOE 
subsamples, I observe firms’ unmanaged ROA is negatively and insignificantly related to 
bank loan size in column 4 for the SOE subsample. It is, however, positively and 
significantly related to bank loan size for the non-SOE subsample in column 6. 
 
These results suggest that the bank loan size is positively related to firm unmanaged 
profitability in non-SOEs, but has no relationship with firms’ unmanaged profitability in 
SOEs. These results support H1 and H2 and are consistent with previous results (Firth et 
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al., 2009), which suggests that banks extend credit based on commercial judgements in 
loan decisions for non-SOE borrowers. Collectively, my findings from Table 3 suggest 
that banks do not always exert effective monitoring through lending, and they exhibit 
different patterns of lending decisions for different types of borrowers when considering 
earnings management adjustment on firm profitability. Specifically, they only exert 
effective monitoring in lending decisions for non-SOE borrowers because they assess 
both quantitative and qualitative measures. Although bank loan size is positively related 
to firms’ reported performance for SOEs, results of this study suggest that banks do not 
use qualitative measures and overlook the credibility of SOEs’ profitability since bank 
loan size is not associated with unmanaged profitability significantly. Therefore, banks 
do not use commercial judgement when make lending decisions to SOEs. 
 
With respect to other control variables, Size is positively related to bank loan size but 
is insignificant for the SOE subsample, which is consistent with Zheng and Zhu (2013) 
and suggests that banks tend to grant larger loans to large firms. Tangibility is negatively 
related to bank loan size, which indicates that firms with a lower level of tangible assets 
and relatively larger total assets have higher demand for bank loans. Leverage is 
negatively related to bank loan size, suggesting that banks are willing to allocate larger 
loans to firms with a lower level of debt. Board is positively related to bank loan size, 
which suggests that banks tend to grant larger loans to firms with more board directors. 




Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and bank loan size 
 Full Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported ROA 0.167***  0.189***  0.179***  
 (11.98)  (8.32)  (11.30)  
Unmanaged ROA  -0.010  -0.019  0.047*** 
  (-1.08)  (-1.42)  (3.37) 
SIZE 0.002** 0.005*** 0.000 0.003** 0.002 0.005*** 
 (2.23) (5.07) (0.05) (2.11) (1.21) (3.00) 
Tangibility -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.028** -0.040*** 
 (-3.11) (-3.78) (-3.49) (-3.96) (-2.45) (-3.45) 
Leverage -0.083*** -0.115*** -0.059*** -0.091*** -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (-12.10) (-17.21) (-6.82) (-10.86) (-2.45) (-3.19) 
Board 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 
 (4.01) (4.21) (3.46) (3.63) (2.46) (2.88) 
Indep 0.033 0.029 0.007 0.003 0.068* 0.070* 
 (1.59) (1.41) (0.27) (0.10) (1.90) (1.93) 
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Political 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.82) (0.80) (0.88) (0.96) (0.27) (0.21) 
Banker 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.73) (0.61) (1.16) (0.83) (-1.02) (-1.06) 
Constant -0.008 -0.051** 0.033 -0.007 -0.030 -0.093** 
 (-0.40) (-2.46) (1.23) (-0.27) (-0.77) (-2.38) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.037 0.044 0.038 0.038 0.022 
N 16622 16622 9372 9372 7096 7096 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans to total assets at current year. Definitions of 
other variables are listed in Appendix. I split the full sample of firms into SOEs and non-SOEs, and repeat the same regressions as for the full 




4.2.2 Bank lending decisions under different bank-firm ownership relationships  
My evidence so far suggests that the positive relationship between bank loan size and 
performance does not hold for SOEs, which is driven by the attribute of borrowers’ 
ownership. In this section, I further explore how bank lending decisions vary according 
to the lending bank ownership. The heterogeneity of the ownership structure of Chinese 
banks provides cross-sectional variation for examining lending decisions by banks which 
are likely to vary according to bank-firm ownership relationships. I identify the types of 
banks that extend loans to my sample firms, and repeat regression analysis for each type 
of bank. To represent the monitoring incentive of banks appropriately, I partition banks 
into three groups, namely, SBs, SMBs and FBs. 
 
I hand-collect the information of the lending bank types from the Notes to the 
Financial Statement dataset of the CSMAR, which provides the loan balance for each 
firm in each year as well as the lending banks, then I add up the loans balances together 
according to the lending bank types. To clearly and precisely identify the lending banks 
that I define above, I exclude syndicated loans and loans where the lending bank is not 
available. It is worth noting that the missing information of the lending bank types on 
loan balance and excluded syndicated loans lead to the sample size dropping and constrain 
explanatory power. Empirically, I re-estimate equation (1) by replacing dependent 
variables with the change of loans from year t-1 to year t, scaled by firm total assets, and 
run the equation for each type of bank. 
 
Table 4 reports the results by focusing on bank loans from SBs. I observe that the 
coefficient on firms’ reported ROA is significant and positive in column 1 but the 
coefficient on unmanaged ROA is positive and significant only at the 10% level. When I 
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look at the results for the SOE subsample in columns 3 and 4, I notice that bank loan size 
is not closely related to either reported ROA or unmanaged ROA, which suggests that: 
firstly, SBs generally do not consider firms’ earnings management behaviour when lend 
to SOE borrowers; and secondly, do not pay much attention to their unmanaged 
performance. This outcome strongly supports my H1 and is consistent with Bai et al. 
(2006), who argue that SBs in China still have considerable responsibility to support 
SOEs. When I look at the results for the non-SOE subsample in columns 5 and 6, I find 
that the coefficients on both reported ROA and unmanaged ROA are positive and 
significant. These results are broadly consistent with H2, indicating that SBs pay attention 
to both qualitative and quantitative measures when allocating capital to non-SOEs. This 
result also emphasizes that SBs do not only focus on the reported profitability but also 
consider the credibility of accounting performance for non-SOE borrowers. Overall, these 
results reveal that SBs’ due diligence and monitoring in lending operations vary between 




Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and SBs’ loan size 
 Full Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported ROA 0.317***  -0.006  0.298***  
 (3.15)  (-0.04)  (3.69)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.140*  -0.021  0.291*** 
  (1.95)  (-0.26)  (3.11) 
SIZE -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021 -0.018 
 (-4.44) (-4.07) (-3.41) (-3.48) (-1.05) (-0.88) 
Tangibility 0.095** 0.076 0.118** 0.119** -0.018 -0.029 
 (1.97) (1.57) (2.46) (2.49) (-0.15) (-0.25) 
Leverage 0.191*** 0.170*** 0.030 0.028 0.275*** 0.283*** 
 (5.22) (4.76) (0.56) (0.56) (6.39) (6.55) 
Board 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 (1.43) (1.36) (1.21) (1.22) (0.50) (0.54) 
Indep -0.039 0.014 -0.102 -0.101 -0.063 0.108 
 (-0.22) (0.08) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.14) (0.23) 
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Political 0.020 0.027 -0.004 -0.004 0.053 0.060 
 (0.87) (1.17) (-0.15) (-0.17) (1.09) (1.23) 
Banker 0.003 0.002 0.024 0.023 -0.013 -0.005 
 (0.18) (0.12) (1.18) (1.18) (-0.32) (-0.13) 
Constant 0.653*** 0.588*** 0.674*** 0.673*** 0.242 0.137 
 (4.04) (3.64) (4.24) (4.31) (0.52) (0.29) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.113 0.059 0.060 0.359 0.348 
N 603 603 357 357 246 246 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans from SBs to total assets at current year. Firms’ 
loan balance from SBs is disclosed in the note to financial statements. Definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix. T-statistics are in 
parentheses, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5 reports the relationship between a firm’s reported performance and 
unmanaged performance and FBs’ loan size. As reported in columns 1 and 2, both firm 
reported ROA and firm unmanaged ROA are positive and significant for the full sample. 
This suggests that FBs assess both qualitative measures and quantitative measures, and 
exert effective efforts to detect borrowers’ earnings management in lending decisions. It 
is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Berger et al., 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009) which 
document that FBs perform better and are more efficient than local Chinese banks. In 
regard to the SOE and non-SOE subsamples, firms’ reported ROA and unmanaged ROA 
are all significant and positive for both the SOE and non-SOE subsamples in columns 3, 
4, 5 and 6, suggesting that FBs seek to detect borrowers’ earnings management in lending 
decisions, regardless of whether the borrower is an SOE or non-SOE. These results 
indicate that the patterns of FB’s lending decisions do not vary for different types of 
borrowers. As the evidence shows FBs exert effective monitoring efforts in lending 
decisions, I expect that negative bank loan announcement effects will not occur when 




Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and FBs’ loan size 
 Full Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported 
ROA 
0.229***  0.187**  0.168***  
 (4.63)  (2.27)  (3.28)  
Unmanaged 
ROA 
 0.096***  0.118**  0.089** 












 (-3.87) (-3.29) (-3.43) (-3.28) (-2.99) (-2.15) 
Tangibility -0.030 -0.037* -0.008 -0.003 -0.053* -0.066** 
 (-1.44) (-1.76) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-1.76) (-2.11) 
Leverage 0.092*** 0.082*** -0.029 -0.044* 0.160*** 0.148*** 
 (4.28) (3.71) (-1.13) (-1.79) (5.96) (5.40) 
Board 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.51) (0.75) (-0.73) (-0.35) 
Indep 0.111* 0.116* 0.182** 0.184** 0.062 0.100 
 (1.70) (1.70) (2.28) (2.30) (0.78) (1.20) 
Political 0.016* 0.019* 0.015 0.014 0.010 0.018 
 (1.69) (1.97) (1.31) (1.17) (0.91) (1.55) 
Banker 0.014* 0.016** 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.009 
 (1.88) (2.00) (1.34) (0.98) (0.97) (0.86) 
Constant 0.225*** 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.173*** 0.244* 0.116 
 (3.42) (2.82) (2.99) (2.79) (1.90) (0.94) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.147 0.134 0.134 0.631 0.603 
N 226 226 123 123 103 103 
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The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of 
bank loans from FBs to total assets at current year. Firms’ loan balance from FBs is 
disclosed in the note to financial statements. Definitions of other variables are listed in 
Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 





Table 6 reports the results of the regressions for the relationship between firms’ 
reported performance and unmanaged performance and SMBs’ loan size. I note that 
coefficients on firms’ reported ROA are all significant and positive for bank loan size for 
the full sample, and the SOE and non-SOE subsamples in columns 1, 3 and 5. However, 
the coefficients on firms’ unmanaged ROA are all insignificant for bank loan size for the 
full sample, and SOE and non-SOE subsamples in columns 2, 4 and 6. These results 
support H1, indicating that SMBs do not use qualitative measures and disregard the 
credibility of borrowing firms’ accounting information, and therefore they do not carry 
out effective monitoring in lending decisions, regardless of whether the borrower is an 
SOE or non-SOE. These results support the view that SMBs still suffer intensive 
government intervention in lending decisions. My results are consistent with the findings 
reported by Chen et al., 2005, who state that on average SMBs are less efficient than SBs. 






Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and SMBs’ loan size 
 Full Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported ROA 0.058***  0.033***  0.099***  
 (0.82)  (0.28)  (0.90)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.002  -0.056  0.030 
  (0.04)  (-1.00)  (0.32) 
SIZE -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.027** -0.025** 
 (-4.21) (-4.12) (-3.01) (-3.01) (-2.51) (-2.40) 
Tangibility -0.060* -0.064* -0.003 -0.002 -0.134* -0.143* 
 (-1.70) (-1.82) (-0.09) (-0.07) (-1.66) (-1.77) 
Leverage 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.028 0.017 0.132*** 0.125*** 
 (5.17) (5.05) (0.75) (0.47) (4.06) (3.95) 
Board -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
 (-0.61) (-0.60) (-0.58) (-0.49) (-0.82) (-0.79) 
Indep 0.185* 0.185* -0.054 -0.054 0.578*** 0.593*** 
 (1.82) (1.81) (-0.54) (-0.54) (2.72) (2.75) 
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Political 0.014 0.014 -0.002 -0.001 0.018 0.017 
 (0.91) (0.94) (-0.14) (-0.09) (0.61) (0.58) 
Banker 0.022* 0.023* 0.008 0.009 0.040 0.042* 
 (1.78) (1.84) (0.64) (0.71) (1.61) (1.69) 
Constant 0.354*** 0.343*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.362 0.326 
 (3.37) (3.29) (3.60) (3.63) (1.35) (1.21) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.143 0.050 0.054 0.302 0.299 
N 433 433 257 257 174 174 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans from SMBs to total assets at current year. 
Firms’ loan balance from SMBs is disclosed in the note to financial statements. Definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix. T-statistics 
are in parentheses, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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4.3 Bank loan announcement effect 
4.3.1 Univariate analysis 
My study so far has focused on bank lending decisions. I find the positive relationship 
between bank loan size and firms’ reported performance is merely cosmetic when state-
owned banks extend loans to SOEs, when the effect of earnings management is 
considered. These findings indicate that banks do not always exert effective monitoring 
through lending. According to the “inside debt” theory, banks’ due diligence and 
monitoring constitute the premise behind bank certification value. Hence, I would expect 
that unfavourable market responses to bank loan announcement should occur when there 
is a disconnection between bank loan size and firms’ reported performance as it reflects 
ineffectiveness of bank monitoring. To test the hypotheses, I borrow insights from studies 
on the effects of loan announcements1, which suggest that the valuation effects of bank 
loan announcements may indicate whether banks make optimal lending decisions, or 
subsidize loans to borrowers for non-profitable reasons (Bailey et al., 2011). 
 
Information on loan announcements is obtained from the CSMAR database. Unlike 
the U.S. SEC rules, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) rules require 
Chinese listed firms to disclose bank loans worth more than 10 million yuan (about 
US$1.5 million) and those greater than 10% of equity book value. Hence, firms’ decisions 
to report bank loan information are in most cases not discretionary.2 As investors usually 
ignores small loans, I eliminate those loans worth less than 10 million yuan. Moreover, 
many loan announcements are not validated as signed loan contracts. For example, some 
 
1 Kang and Liu (2008) explore the effects of bank loan announcements on banks’ stock returns in the 
Japanese market. However, my sample is not suitable for conducting a standard event study for effects of 
loan announcements on lenders, as one bank often grants several loans in a very short period. 
2 Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) suggest that loan announcements may be selective, and that self-
selection bias may influence extant loan announcement research. 
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loans only indicate firms receiving a line of credit. I exclude those loan announcements 
because they do not convey sure signs to investors. Finally, to eliminate the influence of 
other events, I exclude observations surrounded by other events announced within five 
trading days before and after the loan announcements. My final sample consists of 922 
loan announcements between 2003 and 2014, corresponding to 482 listed firms. The 
sample size corresponds to prior studies (Huang et al., 2012). Table 7 presents the 
empirical results CARs around loan announcements for borrowing firms. The CAR in 
Panel A is showed in percentage points and raw value in Panel B. Panel A presents CARs 
for various event windows around loan announcement dates. The mean [-5, -2] CAR is 
negative but not significantly different from 0, suggesting there is no severe information 
leakage prior to the loan announcement. When the event window approaches the 
announcement date, CARs become significantly negative. This supports my prior 
findings and my H3 which negative market reactions to bank loan announcement occur 
if bank loan size has no relationship with firms’ unmanaged performance. 
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports values of average CAR [-1, 4] on borrowing firms for 
different types of banks3. I observe that CARs are significantly negative for bank loans 
to the full sample and SOE subsample, but they are insignificant for non-SOEs. These 
results are consistent with my previous finding and H3, indicating negative bank loan 
announcement effects occur when bank loan size has no relationship with firm 
unmanaged performance. For loans by SMBs, CARs are significantly negative for the full 
sample and SOE subsample, which are consistent with my previous results and H3. For 
loans by FBs, CARs are significantly positive for all samples. These results strongly 
 
3 It is possible that some loan announcements may be leaked just prior to the official announcement date, 




confirm my prior findings, indicating that whether bank loan size has a relationship with 
firms’ unmanaged performance is aligned with bank loan announcement effects. 
Collectively, these results suggest if banks effectively monitor lending decisions and this 
relates to their certification value to the stock market. They also are consistent with Bailey 
et al. (2011), who suggest that Chinese market participants understand that bank lending 




Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around bank loan announcements on borrowing firms. 
Panel A. Average CAR over various event windows 
Event window (0: 
announcement day) 
No. of observations Average CAR (%) 
Percentage of positive 
CARs 
t-test 
[-10, -2] 922 -0.2713 47.35 -0.72 
[-5, -2] 922 -0.2549 47.03 -1.53 
[-2, 2] 922 -0.1886 43.41 -1.50 
[-1, 1] 922 -0.1253 43.73 -1.17 
[-1, 2] 922 -0.2970 43.49 -1.78** 
[-1, 4] 922 -0.3747 45.21 -2.61*** 
[-1, 6] 922 -0.5669 44.36 -2.53** 
[-1, 10] 922 -0.7462 44.03 -2.59*** 
 
Panel B. Values of CAR [-1, 4] on borrowing firms for three types of banks 
       
Type of 
banks 












All banks 922 -0.004*** 499 -0.005*** 423 -0.002 
  (-2.61)  (-2.87)  (-0.98) 
SBs 517 -0.005*** 291 -0.006*** 226 -0.005* 
  (-3.13)  (-2.67)  (-1.80) 
Non-SBs 93 0.013*** 39 0.012** 54 0.013** 
  (3.37)  (2.12)  (2.59) 
SMBs 312 -0.006** 169 -0.009** 143 -0.004 
  (-2.06)  (-2.27)  (-0.86) 
The sample consists of 922 loan announcements between 2003 and 2014 from 482 firms. Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
calculated by using the market model. The estimation window for estimating the expected returns of the borrowing firm is [-120, -21]. T-statistics 
are in parentheses, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
54 
 
To better understand the certification role of banks and the anomalous effects of bank 
loan announcements in China, I further conduct univariate analyses. In particular, I 
categorize CARs by characteristics of borrowing firms, lenders and loans. Due to some 
missing information on some variables, the sum of the number of observations is not 
always equal to total sample size. Table 8 presents the results of the univariate tests on 
CARs sorted by characteristics of borrowing firms. Studies on bank loan announcements 
in developed markets suggest the positive effects of bank loan announcements are 
pronounced for weak and informationally opaque borrowers (Field et al., 2006; Ross, 
2010). Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2012) suggest that banks can certify 
borrowers’ accounting quality and ease the concerns of investors. Hence, how bank loan 
announcement effects vary with firms’ accounting quality is worth to explore in China. I 
use the absolute value of borrowing firms’ discretionary accruals, which is one year 
preceding the loan announcement, to proxy firms’ accounting information quality. As 
reported in Table 8, I divide firms based on the median level of earnings management. 
The negative effect of bank loan announcements is significantly greater for firms with 
higher earnings management levels than for firms with a lower level.  
 
This suggests that bank loan announcements in China even stir investors’ concerns 
when borrowers’ accounting profitability is weak. This aligns with my prior finding that 
Chinese banks generally overlook the credibility of borrowers’ accounting information. 
Compared to SBs, SMBs appear to be less concerned about borrowers’ earnings quality. 
Firstly, SMBs struggle to compete with SBs due their smaller size, especially when 
borrowers are listed firms. Hence, SMBs have incentives to lower their credit rating 
standard to win clients from SB competitors. Furthermore, the SMBs are jointly owned 
by local governments, SOEs and private investors. Owing to the ownership structure, 
55 
 
these banks could face political pressure from local governments and SOEs, and have 
weaker incentives to perform monitoring activities on borrowing firms. As my previous 
results suggest that both SBs and SMBs overlook the credibility of borrowing firms’ 
accounting information, and their loan announcements yield negative loan announcement 
effects, I divide lenders into domestic banks and foreign banks for comparison. Table 8 
shows that loans by domestic banks have significantly negative CARs, but loans by 
foreign banks have positive CARs (significant at the 5% level). The difference between 
domestic and foreign banks is also significant. These results confirm my prior findings 
and suggest that the certification value of domestic banks is small but that of foreign 
banks is large. The other pair-wise comparisons, including RPT, ROA, percentage of 
largest shareholder’s ownership, borrowing firm’s ownership, market cap, loan size, loan 




Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) categorized by characteristics of borrowing firms, lenders and loans  
Category No. of 
observations 








The level of earnings management of 
borrowing firms 
      
  Above median 432 -0.009 -3.60*** -2.739*** -0.008* 43.75 
  Below median 428 -0.002 -0.88 -1.162  47.66 
RPT       
  Above median 433 -0.006** -2.26** -1.809* -0.002 45.96 
  Below median 427 -0.004 -1.55 -1.725*  45.43 
Firm performance (ROA)       
  Increased 374 -0.005** -2.23** -2.328** -0.000 46.26 
  Not increased 486 -0.005** -2.44** -1.600  45.27 
Percentage of largest shareholder’s 
ownership 
      
  Above median 407 -0.007*** -2.90*** -2.821*** -0.004 -0.004 
  Below median 407 -0.003 -1.22*** -0.641  46.93 
Borrowing firm’s ownership       
  SOEs 499 -0.006*** -2.96*** -1.924* -0.002 43.69 
  Non-SOEs 423 -0.004 -1.58 -1.953*  48.46 
Market cap       
  Above median 461 -0.006*** -2.71*** -2.075** -0.002 44.69 
  Below median 461 -0.004* -1.83* -1.695*  47.07 
Lender’s type       
  Domestic banks 829 -0.006*** -3.74*** -3.198*** -0.011** 45.24 
  Foreign banks 93 0.010** 2.40** 2.388*  51.61 
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Loan size       
  Above median 499 -0.004* -1.75* -0.882 0.003 45.49 
  Below median 423 -0.007*** -2.83*** -2.884***  46.34 
Loan maturity       
  More than 1 year 451 -0.003 -1.60 -1.599 0.003 46.56 
  Equal or less than 1 year 471 -0.006*** -2.91*** -2.192**  45.22 
Pledge       
With pledge 84 -0.010* -1.93* -1.599 -0.005 39.29 
With no pledge  838 -0.005*** -2.77*** -2.192**  46.54 
The sample consists of 922 loan announcements between 2003 and 2014 from 482 firms. Sample size decreases as data for some firms’ financial 
information and loan characteristics are unavailable. T-statistics are in parentheses, while ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 





4.3.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section I carry out regression analysis to explore banks’ certification role on 
firms’ accounting information. The dependent variable is CARs for the six-day event 
window of [-1, 4]. Following prior studies (e.g., Chaney et al., 2011), I use the absolute 
value of borrowing firms’ discretionary accruals, which is one year preceding the loan 
announcement, to proxy firms’ accounting information quality. The absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is widely used as a measure of earnings quality (Dechow et al., 
2010). Consistent with prior studies, I also control for characteristics of firms and loans. 
The definitions and measurement information for the variables are reported in Appendix.   
  
Table 9 presents the results of the multivariate analyses. All models show EM is 
significantly and negatively related to CARs, indicating that investors react more 
negatively to borrowing firms with a higher level of earnings management. Unlike the 
findings in developed markets that bank loans play the certification role, I find that 
Chinese banks granting loans to firms with poor quality of financial information amplifies 
investors’ uncertainty. This result is consistent with prior findings that Chinese banks 
overlook the credibility of borrowers’ accounting information. Moreover, for comparison, 
I use the interaction term FB×EM to explore whether foreign banks exert a certifying 
function on borrowing firms’ accounting information. As reported in column 4, the 
coefficient of FB×EM is significantly positive, indicating that borrowing firms with 
poorer quality of earnings receive more favourable market reactions when they borrow 
from FBs. This result supports my prior findings that FBs exert effective monitoring 
through lending. I also introduce an interaction term SOE×EM to estimate if SOEs impact 
the relationship between CARs and EM. Perhaps because of the small sample, SOE×EM 
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is not significant. My findings also imply that, in a developing economy such as China, 
firms can ease investors’ concerns over their accounting information quality by choosing 
foreign banks and not domestic banks. 
 
Referring to other variables, all models show the coefficient on RPT is significant 
and negative, which is consistent with Bailey et al. (2011) and Huang et al. (2012). This 
result indicates that the negative effect of loan announcements is stronger for firms 
involved with more tunnelling activities. The coefficient on MKT is negative and 
significant for all models, suggesting that investors react more negatively to larger firms. 





Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs): Multivariate regression analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EM -0.0626*** -0.0583*** -0.0795*** -0.1423*** -0.1042*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0249) (0.0274) (0.0309) 
      
ROA  0.1131** 0.0258 0.0168 0.0366 
  (0.0489) (0.0620) (0.0607) (0.0615) 
      
RPT  -0.1374*** -0.2224*** -0.2340*** -0.2052*** 
  (0.0390) (0.0457) (0.0447) (0.0456) 
      
MKT  -0.0081*** -0.0129*** -0.0121*** -0.0137*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
      
LAR_RIGHT  -0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0039 -0.0025 
  (0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
      
SOE  0.0046 -0.0012 -0.0022 0.0016 
  (0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0070) 
      
Tangibility  0.0125 -0.0017 0.0022 -0.0019 
  (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0157) 
      
ROA_UP  0.0060 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0017 
  (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
      
LOANSIZE   0.0039* 0.0036* 0.0046** 
   (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
      
TERM   0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 
   (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
      
FB   0.0405*** -0.0074 0.0403*** 
   (0.0078) (0.0123) (0.0077) 
      
FB×EM    0.3552***  
    (0.0716)  
      
SOE×EM     -0.0359 
     (0.0450) 
Constant 0.0005 0.1048*** 0.1447*** 0.1448*** 0.1437*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0344) (0.0502) (0.0491) (0.0497) 
Adjusted R2 0.0120 0.0938 0.1759 0.2135 0.1932 
N 770 770 547 547 547 
The dependent variable is CAR [-1, 4]. Definitions of other variables are listed in 
Appendix. Sample size decreases as data for some firms’ financial information and loan 
characteristics are unavailable. T-statistics are in parentheses, while ***, **, and * 










5.1 Bias in earnings management 
It is possible that my results do not hold because of bias in earnings management 
measure. First, the modified Jones model may overestimate the level of earnings 
management. For this reason, I employ the Dechow and Dichev (2002)1 model and repeat 
my analysis of bank lending decisions to mitigate this concern. The results of the 
regressions are reported in Table 10, which are consistent with my previous results. 
Second, Shan et al. (2013) find that unexpected accruals can be biased for firms with large 
external financing cash flows. This could lead to misjudgment of firms’ earnings 
management behavior and cause my results biased. To address this, I employ a model 
controlling for the effect of external financing on unexpected accruals2 and repeat the 
previous analysis. Results of the regressions are reported in Table 11 which are consistent 
with my previous results. 
 






















where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  is total accruals in year t, calculated as [change in current assets − change in current 
liabilities − change in cash − change in debt in current liabilities − depreciation and amortization 
expense], 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 is one-year lagged total assets, 𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  is change in revenue in year t, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  is 
property, plant, and equipment, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1 are past, present, and 
future cash flow, i, t are firm and year index, respectively. 


















where 𝑋𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡  is net external financing, defined as the sum of net debt financing and net equity financing 




Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and bank loan size when firms’ earnings management is measured utilizing the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model.  
 
Panel A: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and bank loan size 
 Full Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported ROA 0.175***  0.206***  0.185***  
 (12.53)  (9.25)  (11.44)  
Unmanaged ROA  -0.000  -0.297***  0.173*** 
  (-0.78)  (-3.21)  (7.56) 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.063 0.029 0.006 0.038 0.022 
N 16583 16583 9360 9360 7096 7096 
 
Panel B: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and SBs’ loan size 
Reported ROA 0.266***  -0.004  0.264***  
 (2.59)  (-0.03)  (3.11)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.422  4.554  0.252** 
  (0.23)  (0.67)  (2.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.008 0.088 0.016 0.304 0.295 
N 603 603 357 357 246 246 
       
Panel C: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and FBs’ loan size 
Reported ROA 0.225***  0.147**  0.216***  
 (4.68)  (2.03)  (4.96)  
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Unmanaged ROA  0.091***  0.082*  0.115*** 
  (2.66)  (1.72)  (2.72) 
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.274 0.199 0.191 0.628 0.564 
N 226 226 123 123 103 103 
       
Panel D: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and SMBs’ loan size 
Reported ROA 0.052***  0.048***  0.061***  
 (3.76)  (4.58)  (3.02)  
Unmanaged ROA  -0.011  0.012  -0.048 
  (-0.1)  (0.14)  (-0.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.145 0.096 0.168 0.217 0.252 
N 433 433 257 257 174 174 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans to total assets at current year. Firms’ loan 
balance from different types of banks is disclosed in the note to financial statements. Definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix. T-





Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and bank loan size when firms’ earnings management is measured by a model which 
controls for the effect of external financing on unexpected accruals.  
Panel A: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and bank loan size 
 Full Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported ROA 0.152***  0.156***  0.173***  
 (9.62)  (6.17)  (9.73)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.007  0.003  0.055*** 
  (0.60)  (0.19)  (3.38) 
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.032 0.039 0.035 0.031 0.018 
N 14260 14260 7960 7960 6149 6149 
 
Panel B: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and SBs’ loan size 
Reported ROA 0.302***  -0.013  0.231***  
 (2.80)  (-0.09)  (2.88)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.981  0.044  0.236** 
  (0.51)  (0.50)  (2.53) 
Adjusted R2 0.149 -0.019 0.057 0.058 0.394 0.389 
N 593 593 351 351 242 242 
       
Panel C: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and FBs’ loan size 
Reported ROA 0.171***  0.129**  0.128**  
 (4.13)  (2.03)  (2.21)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.089***  0.155**  0.075** 
  (3.27)  (2.55)  (2.24) 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.097 0.040 0.031 0.177 0.145 
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N 226 226 123 123 103 103 
       
Panel D: Reported firm performance, unmanaged performance and SMBs’ loan size 
Reported ROA 0.092***  0.029***  0.076***  
 (4.74)  (5.63)  (6.28)  
Unmanaged ROA  -0.011  -0.076*  -0.048 
  (-0.16)  (-1.72)  (-0.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.109 0.035 0.074 0.189 0.146 
N 430 430 249 249 174 174 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans to total assets at current year. Firms’ loan 
balance from different types of banks is disclosed in the note to financial statements. Definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix. T-




5.2 Endogeneity issue 
My findings that bank lending decisions vary across borrowers with different 
ownership structure are consistent with the results of market reaction to bank loan 
announcements. Apart from this robustness check, I also conduct a firm fixed-effects 
regression to further deal with the endogeneity issue. First, I consider that bank lending 
decisions may be impacted by unobserved firm characteristics. Specifically, firms might 
have other characteristics unconsidered in our model that influence both firm 
performance and loan finance. Hence, I apply the firm fixed-effects regression to control 
for unobservable time-invariant firm-specific effects. The results of the regressions are 
reported in Table 12. After controlling for firm fixed effects, the positive relationship 
between bank loan size and firm reported performance is still merely cosmetic for both 




Bank loan size and firm performance: Firm fixed effects regression 
 Full sample  SOE  Non-SOE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported ROA 0.095***  0.094***  0.163***  
 (6.26)  (3.63)  (9.16)  
Unmanaged ROA  -0.027***  -0.047***  0.057*** 
  (-2.75)  (-3.38)  (3.81) 
Results of other variables, which include Size, Tangibility, Leverage, Board, Indep, PC, BT and year and industry fixed effects, are not 
reported.  Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix. 
       
Constant 0.615*** 0.609*** 0.946*** 0.953*** 0.780*** 0.741*** 
 (15.90) (15.71) (17.37) (17.46) (11.65) (10.98) 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.020 0.012 0.012 -0.106 -0.119 
N 16622 16622 9372 9372 7096 7096 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions, is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans to total assets at current year. I split the full 
sample of firms into SOEs and non-SOEs and repeat the same regressions as for the full sample. Firm fixed effect regression with standard errors 
is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering within firms. T-statistics are in parentheses, while ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at the 





5.3 Additional robustness test 
Finally, I implement an additional robustness test by examining bank lending practice 
after the China’s economic stimulus package. In 2008, due to the global financial crisis, 
China encountered a sharp contraction in exports and foreign direct investment and 
launched an economic stimulus package to minimize the impact (Hsu et al., 2015). The 
economic stimulus package aims to increase the loan supply and encouraging investment 
by firms, which is more pronounced in SOEs (Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2015). 
Moreover, because of the policies that eased provision of credit, the lending expanded 
rapidly, and bank loan officers were not liable for loans they granted if the loans were 
made in support of the stimulus package (Naughton, 2009). Hence, this event represents 
us with an opportunity to test whether bank lending decisions worsen in the post-financial 
crisis period. During the economic stimulus package period, the relationship between 
bank loan size and firm reported performance will be weakened, which is more 
pronounced in SOEs. Liu et al. (2018) find that the economic stimulus packages cause 
weaker relationships between bank loans and firm performance and SOEs receiving more 
loans than non-SOEs.  
To test the impact of the shock, I include Post, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for firm-year observations during the economic stimulus package period between 2009 
and 2010 and 0 otherwise and repeat the previous analysis of bank lending decisions. The 
results are reported in Table 13. I observe that the interaction term Post*Reported ROA 
is significantly negative for the SOE subsample in column 3, indicating that banks 
overlook firms’ reported performance when lending decisions are being made. I also 
observe that Post*Reported ROA is insignificant, and the interaction term 
Post*Unmanaged ROA is negative and significant for the non-SOE subsample in columns 
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5 and 6, suggesting that banks extend more credit to firms exhibiting poor unmanaged 
performance during the economic stimulus package period. In sum, these robustness tests 
confirm my main finding that the positive relationship between bank loan size and firms’ 
reported performance is cosmetic. Furthermore, the relationship between bank loan size 





Additional robustness test: The impact of stimulus package on the relationship between bank loan size and firm performance 
 Full sample  SOE  Non-SOE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.008** 0.008* 0.012*** 
 (3.71) (3.79) (3.51) (2.39) (1.67) (2.64) 
Post*Reported ROA -0.111**  -0.214***  -0.027  
 (-2.48)  (-3.22)  (-0.44)  
Post*Unmanaged ROA  -0.099***  -0.049  -0.170*** 
  (-3.68)  (-1.31)  (-4.23) 
Reported ROA 0.188***  0.239***  0.183***  
 (12.39)  (9.67)  (10.71)  
Unmanaged ROA  0.009  -0.006  0.074*** 
  (0.90)  (-0.39)  (4.82) 
Results of other variables are not reported, which includes Size, Tangibility, Leverage, Board, Indep, PC, BT and year and industry fixed 
effects. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix. 
 
Constant -0.053*** -0.098*** -0.017 -0.062*** -0.072** -0.139*** 
 (-2.82) (-5.23) (-0.71) (-2.64) (-1.99) (-3.85) 
r2 0.027 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.024 0.010 
N 16622 16622 9372 9372 7096 7096 
The dependent variable, bank lending decisions is measured as the change in the ratio of bank loans to total assets at current year. I split the full 
sample of firms into SOEs and non-SOEs and repeat the same regressions as for the full sample. T-statistics are in parentheses, while ***, **, and 











6.1 Firms’ earnings management behaviour and bank lending and announcement 
effects 
 
This paper explores bank certification value from the perspective of bank lending 
decisions by considering the effects of earnings management. Although a number of 
studies documents that Chinese banks extend loans based on borrowers’ profitability 
and indicates they make efficient lending decisions, negative bank loan announcement 
effects are still prevalent in China. Hence, I posit that banks may not always implement 
effective monitoring through lending, and it should matter for bank loan announcement 
effects.  
 
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that bank loan size is positively associated 
with firm reported profitability, but has no relationship with firms’ unmanaged 
profitability Specifically, this case appears when state-owned banks lend to SOEs. 
Moreover, in alignment with the notion that banks’ unique certification value is based 
on the effectiveness of bank monitoring, my analysis reveals that negative bank loan 
announcement occurs when there is a disconnection between bank loan size and firm 
reported profitability. These findings suggest that the extent to which banks carry out 
effective monitoring through lending greatly affect the certification value on borrowers’ 
quality in the perspective of investors in the stock markets. 
 
Overall, there are two main suggestions that can be drawn from findings of this 
study. The first suggestion is that banks do not always exert effective monitoring 
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through lending. The second suggestion is that banks effective monitoring efforts in 
lending decisions relate to bank certification role to stock markets. My study contributes 
to the existing literature on effects of bank loan announcement and bank lending 
decisions and helps us to better comprehend certain puzzling factors in the Chinese 
banking sector. This study is of great interest to academics, practitioners and regulators, 
and contributes to issues ranging from bolstering the efficiency of bank loan allocation 
to reshaping banking regulations, such as the privatization of banking in China.  
 
6.2 Implications of this study 
 
My findings offer important implications in several ways. First, in emerging 
markets where investor protection is weak, earnings management is prevalent and state 
ownership of bank and firm is prominent, the positive relationship between firm 
performance and bank loan size is merely cosmetic in some case and banks do not 
always exert efforts to screen borrowing firms. Hence, this finding emphasizes the 
importance of banks’ real monitoring efforts in quantitative measures in credit 
evaluation process and call for actions to strengthen quantitative measures. Furthermore, 
my evidence shows that bank lending decisions are likely to vary according to bank-
firm ownership relationships. This suggests that some policies should be formed ad hoc 
for specific bank-firm ownership relationship. Finally, this study implies that without 
real screening efforts, approval of bank loan could amplify investors uncertainty over 
borrowers. 
 
6.3 Limitations of this study 
 
One limitation of this study was the sample of bank loan announcements. Although 
disclosure of bank loan information is mandatory for Chinese listed firms, firms did not 
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always specify whether the loan announcements are validated as signed loan contracts. 
Accordingly, this study excludes those loan announcements that cannot be determined 
as signed contracts. Hence, my sample of bank loan announcements was relatively 
small. With the development of the Chinese capital market and information disclosure, 
the information on bank loan announcements in listed firms could be more complete. 
A future study exploring bank loan announcement effects could benefit from a larger 
sample size. Moreover, I admit that the impact of endogeneity cannot be completely 





Definitions of variables  
 
Variables Definition 
∆DEBT The change in bank loans to total assets at current year. 
Reported ROA One-year lagged performance in the rate of return on assets. 
%DA One-year lagged discretionary accruals as a fraction of assets. 
Unmanaged ROA 
A measure of a firm’s unmanaged performance, calculated as 
Reported ROA-%DA 
Size 
Firm size, which is measured as one-year lagged natural log of 
total assets. 
Tangibility One-year lagged net fixed assets divided by total assets. 
Leverage One-year lagged total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Board 
The natural log of total number of directors on the boards at 
current year. 
Indep 
The number of independent directors to total number of 
directors on the boards. 
Political 
A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO or director on the 
boards has a government background at current year and zero 
otherwise. 
Banker 
A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO or director on 
boards has bank background at current year and zero 
otherwise. 
EM 
The absolute value of a borrowing firm’s discretionary accrual 
to total assets of the year preceding the loan announcement. 
ROA_UP 
A dummy variable equal to one if a borrowing firm’s ROA in 
announcement year increased compared with the previous year. 
RPT 
Other receivables to total assets of the year preceding the loan 
announcement. 
LA_RIGHT 
A dummy variable if the percentage of shares outstanding 
owned by the largest shareholder is greater than the median 
value. 
MKT 
The natural logarithm of market value of borrowing firms’ 
tradable shares. 
SOE A dummy variable equal to one if a loan is borrowed by SOEs. 
LOANSIZE The natural logarithm of a bank loan. 
TERM The maturity of a bank loan. 
FB 
A dummy variable equal to one if a loan is granted by foreign 
banks. 
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